Nineteen states allow recalls of state officials. The remaining states allow recalls of select public officials. Hover over states on the map below to learn about the offices eligible for recall in each state and to learn which states require legal or political grounds for recalls.
Ballotpedia publishes two reports each year to highlight recall statistics and notable recall efforts at the local and state government levels. Click the links below to read these reports:.
The United States Constitution does not provide for recall of any elected federal official. The option was considered during the drafting of the document in , but was not included in the final version. Some state constitutions have stated the right of citizens to recall their members of the United States Congress , but whether it is constitutionally legal at the federal level has not been yet been ruled upon by the United States Supreme Court.
One of the closest noted legal precedent is U. Term Limits, Inc. Thornton , in which the Supreme Court decided that states did not have the right to impose new terms, qualifications, or conditions of service on federal officials.
Some states have released opinions and rulings on recall of members of the U. Attorney generals in Arkansas , Louisiana , Kansas , Nevada , and Oregon all issued opinions against the recall of federal officials. Conversely, the Attorney General of Wisconsin in give an opinion that state administration could not reject a petition for recall of a member of the U. Voters are then asked to vote for a candidate for the office. The official who is the subject of the recall may not be among the listed candidates.
If a majority votes "yes" on the recall question, then the incumbent is recalled and the successor is elected via the second part of the ballot. If a majority votes "no" on the recall question, the incumbent remains in office and the second portion of the ballot is moot. In the other states using the simultaneous model Arizona, Michigan, Nevada, North Dakota and Wisconsin , the submission and certification of the recall petition essentially triggers a special election for the office, and the recall ballot consists of a list of candidates for the office.
The name of the official who is the subject of the recall may appear on the ballot along with other nominees. In fact, in Arizona, Michigan, North Dakota and Wisconsin, the name of the official being recalled is automatically placed on the recall ballot for reelection unless the official resigns from office. In the remaining 12 states, the recall ballot contains only the question of whether the official should be recalled.
If the majority votes for recall, the office is declared vacant and is filled at a special election or as otherwise provided by law, which in some states is by appointment for the remainder of the term. The chart below details how the recall election is conducted in each state. The name of the officer against whom the recall was filed may appear on the ballot for re-election. The first asks whether the officer against whom the recall petition was filed should be recalled. The second part consists of a list of candidates who have qualified for the election.
Note that courts in both states have ruled that a voter's choice of candidate on the second part of the ballot must be counted regardless of whether the person cast a vote on the recall question first. Colorado — Const. Louisiana — Const. Nevada — Const. New Jersey — Const. North Dakota — Const. Washington — Const. Create Account. Recall of State Officials. Recall of Local Officials In at least 30 states some sources place this number at 38 , recall elections may be held in local jurisdictions.
History and Use of the Recall in the U. All Recall Elections Held in the U. Technically he resigned from office before the results of the recall election were certified, but the results were sufficient to recall him. Senator Pam Galloway resigned earlier in the year when enough signatures were gathered to trigger a recall election against her. Even though her name wasn't on the ballot, a recall election was still held for her seat.
How the Recall Process Works The recall process varies in its details from one state to another, but in general, recall campaigns follow these steps: 1. Grounds for Recall In most of the recall states, any registered voter can begin a recall campaign for any reason. Circulating a Recall Petition The recall process is similar to the ballot initiative process in that it requires the submission of citizen petitions. Describes recall as an instrument of direct democracy that seeks to improve governmental accountability.
Skip to main content Skip to table of contents. Advertisement Hide. This service is more advanced with JavaScript available. The Politics of Recall Elections. Editors view affiliations Yanina Welp Laurence Whitehead. Describes recall as an instrument of direct democracy that seeks to improve governmental accountability Provides a comprehensive analysis of recall, spread and the consequences for representation Makes an important contribution to our understanding of the mechanisms of direct participation.
Front Matter Pages i-xix. Pages What benefits is it supposed to deliver? Let us start with the most interesting arguments put forward by Thomas Cronin's , pp. I will then add a new argument, based on trust and the symbolic benefits of the recall.
The recall provides for continuous accountability, so that voters need not wait until the next election to rid themselves of an incompetent, dishonest, unresponsive, or irresponsible public official.
Electoral representation is based on the assumption that voters should be able to get rid of unsatisfying representatives, and the recall is supposed to make this easier, thereby increasing the incentives faced by representatives to care about public opinion. This argument sounds very plausible on paper. To the extent that elections can generate a form of accountability, more frequent opportunities to sanction elected representatives should increase accountability.
What is more, candidates sometimes lie and voters sometimes make mistakes; it therefore makes sense to provide voters with an effective tool to correct their errors of appreciation Bowler, , p, However, several scholars have questioned the capacity of voters to effectively hold their representatives accountable for actions engaging their responsibility.
In most democracies, voters have been found to be largely ignorant about the work or even identity of their representatives Somin, ; Brennan, ; Achen and Bartels, 8. Therefore, they are often not properly equipped to judge their representatives' policy choices.
As a result, when voters do vote retrospectively, they often seem to reward or sanction representatives for things they are not responsible for, such as droughts, floods or a suddenly changing economic dynamic in the months preceding an election whatever the economic results of the whole term in office.
Nevertheless, the fact that citizens lack relevant information when they vote is not fatal to electoral accountability. As Achen and Bartels , p. What is more, elected politicians usually ignore the extent to which electoral accountability is defective.
Thus, the mere threat of sanction might influence them even if citizens do not sanction effectively. Therefore, to the extent that the availability of recall constitutes a serious threat, accountability could be increased by it. In practice, the evidence that the availability of recall mechanisms leads to more responsiveness and accountability is not clearly established. One reason is that the mechanism is not used much, even when available, which reduces the threat faced by incumbents.
Thus, for example, Bowler , p. What is more, most of the attempts do not lead to a recall referendum Welp, , p. This does not mean that the availability of recall has no effect on representatives, but it means that it is hard to measure at this stage and that we cannot assert with full confidence that it will be effective, if introduced in a new context. We should have modest expectations in this respect, at least until wider experimentation provides us with more scientific evidence.
The recall helps check undue influence by narrow special interests. Is it a realistic expectation, though? If the problem is that money pervades politics, recall may not be the solution, as campaigning for recall is costly as well, and special interest groups may instrumentalize the recall to private ends see Garrett, ; Campodonico, As brought to attention by Cronin , pp.
Empirically, though, it is not clear whether compared to policies enacted through traditional representative procedures, popular initiative referendums are better aligned with the preferences of the majority or more vulnerable to capture. Gerber and Matsusaka , for example, defend the former view in the US context, but Lax and Phillips , studying the same context, saw no correlation between the availability of direct democracy instruments and responsiveness to majority preferences. Beyond the US, though, scholars of direct democracy seem less pessimistic about the capture of popular initiatives by the wealthy Altman, , pp.
In any case, general considerations about this are bound to be somewhat speculative. The risk might be highly context-dependent. Nevertheless, whether or not they are properly and effectively used in practice, recall mechanisms increase voters' opportunities to control their representatives—and hence potentially to check undue influence.
Given that there is no apparent reason to expect a higher influence of private lobbies with recall than without, absent countervailing reasons we would have reasons to support this device, based on its empowering potential. Then, it is the media's role to report misbehavior and breach of promises, and it is the citizens' role to pay attention and mobilize when it proves necessary. The recall enables jurisdictions to permit their officials to serve longer terms.
This argument is interesting insofar as it responds to two objections frequently addressed to the recall. First, it is costly, as popular votes are organized more frequently. Second, it creates a state of permanent campaigning an objection to which we shall come back later. However, if the introduction of recall goes with an extension of the terms if office and if recalls are not too frequent, the cost might not be excessive.
And more importantly, elected representatives keeping the support of their constituents would be able to widen their time-horizon, which is not negligible considering the current environmental crisis. There is no empirical indication, however, that the introduction of recall is usually associated with an extension of terms.
And in cases where both measures would be combined, there would be a trade-off between a recall procedure too easy to enact, which would create permanent campaigning, and a procedure too difficult to enact, which might reduce the potential for accountability.
The recall offers a safety-valve mechanism for intense feelings. It is part of the nature of elections to create hope, and then to generate disappointment Przeworski, And when disappointment is high, it can be very frustrating for voters to wait until the end of the term to be able to cause effective change. The alternative, then, is popular protest, taking the street and often hopelessly pressuring the government for a change in its policy orientation—actions generating risks of conflict and political instability.
Judged from this perspective, the recall certainly looks promising as a channel or an outlet for popular frustration Lijphart, , provided that the tool is generally known, which is not always the case Welp and Whitehead, , p. Lenin himself asserted that the right of recall would have made a violent revolution unnecessary in see Qvortrup, , p.
This pacifying effect, however, is not guaranteed—and it is highly context-dependent Whitehead, , p. Some uses of the recall could actually increase political conflicts. As we shall see, we should not be blind to the possibility of partisan instrumentalizations of the mechanism. If the main effect of the recall was to provide a tool for poor losers to contest elections result, the democratic gain would not be clear Welp, ; White and Ypi, We will come back to this in section The Risks of Instrumentalization and Polarization.
The recall might increase trust in the representative system. This argument might come as a surprise. Some might expect the recall to create an atmosphere of permanent suspicion toward representatives, with the result of reinforcing distrust. By institutionalizing an additional mechanism to sanction representatives, are we not sending the message that the public is right to be suspicious, to mistrust elected politicians Bauer and Fatke, ?
The effect that the recall may have on regime trust is an empirical question that remains largely open and whose answer partly depends on the particular combination of recall mechanisms with other institutions in a given context.
However, consistently with what has sometimes been found about the initiative and referendum Gherghina, , empowering citizens with a new tool for political action may increase regime trust.
More important for this research topic is the issue of trust in the electoral representative system. This question is also very uncertain, but we have some empirical indications to draw on. First, from what we know about the practice of recall in the US, it seems that it reinforces trust in the electoral representative system, as expressed by levels of turnout Qvortrup, , p. This result should be tested in other institutional contexts, but I see some reasons to expect a positive effect on this specific kind of trust as well.
As mentioned in the introduction, although the recall is often presented as an instrument of direct democracy Cronin, ; Altman, ; Welp, , it does not question the principle of representation in contrast with initiatives and referendums.
And it does not question electoral legitimacy in contrast with sortition. What it does is questioning a certain understanding of electoral representation Bowler, ; Whitehead, —based on blind trust and the relative independence from public opinion. Yet given that many citizens are unsatisfied with that model of representation and would value more control over their representatives see again Bedock, and Dolez, forthcoming in this Frontiers research topic , the availability of recall mechanisms is likely to increase citizens' satisfaction with their representative institutions.
Citizens might gain a sense of popular power and control over their representatives, potentially increasing trust in the ability of elections to generate adequate representation. The benefits of the recall, in this case, are mostly symbolic: it may alter the perception of the representative relationship in a desirable way.
Without the recall, the assumption seems to be that citizens choose their preferred elites and then must wait patiently for the next election, where these elites will try to seduce them again. With the recall, the representative relationship becomes somewhat less hierarchical.
It appears more clearly that representatives are agents of the people and cannot allow themselves to betray the confidence conferred to them by the election. As any employee, they can be fired at any time if their work is judged unsatisfying or if they commit a professional fault From this perspective, whether or not the availability of recall is sufficient to secure increased accountability and responsiveness to majority preferences, it could be valued by citizens and it could improve their perception of electoral representation.
As seems to have been the case with the practice of ostracism in Athens Forsdyke, ; Malkopoulou, , p. Consistently with this, though, trust in the political class may diminish. This could happen, for example, if citizens fail to appreciate the diversity of constraints faced by governments. If they systematically sanction their representatives for failures to deliver on some expectations that they simply cannot meet, the mechanism could then turn out to be unable to support trust in electoral representation.
In other words, if citizens keep recalling representatives without seeing any improvement, they might end up losing faith in elections and recalls. Yet a benefit of the recall, in this respect, might be to encourage elected politicians to be clearer about these constraints and how they deal with them. The increased risk of sanction should incentivize them not to promise the impossible and to take the necessary time to justify themselves publicly when they have failed to honor some promises for reasons beyond their control.
Again, the effect on trust might turn out to be positive. Yet this remains to be checked empirically. The main purpose of the recall is to strengthen representatives' accountability toward citizens and thereby to make them more responsive and less vulnerable to undue influence. In addition to this, it may make it easier to extend terms in office, and more importantly, it may provide an alternative channel for citizens' frustration and generate more trust in the electoral representative system.
There is no clear empirical evidence that all these benefits will necessarily result from institutionalizing recall mechanisms. Nevertheless, what can reasonably be expected is that citizens would be satisfied with the availability of an additional tool of expression and that this tool may increase accountability and responsiveness on the long run if it is sufficiently used.
It is too early, however, to conclude that the recall improves electoral representation. There are several important objections that need to be considered, including objections to the very idea of strengthening accountability on which support for the recall is usually based. When the first representative governments were created in Europe and the USA, it was decided explicitly not to use recall mechanisms in order to guarantee the independence of representatives, who were thought to be better positioned to judge in the name of the people, in light of circumstances sometimes unknown by citizens, what policies would serve the public interest Manin, The first objection I would like to discuss is therefore the one grounded on the value of independence for representation.
I will then consider a connected theoretical objection—the moral constituency objection—against the idea of increasing accountability to a specific constituency. Then, I will come to more practical objections, pointing respectively to the risks of instrumentalization, polarization, and permanent campaigning.
Finally, I will consider the harshness objection, suggesting that the prospect of public recall may turn some quality people away from politics.
The relative independence of representatives is one of the distinguishing features of modern representative governments Manin, The thought being that elections would bring to power those who distinguish themselves from the mass, who are in some respect superior to ordinary citizens, it appeared important, at the time of creation of these new regimes, not to tie the representatives' hands too much.
Thus, representative governments were largely based on an elitist understanding of representation. There is however a diversity of arguments that can be provided in favor of the independence of representatives, which are not all based on such elitist premises.
The relative independence of elected representatives has historically been defended for four main reasons Pitkin, ; Manin, ; Przeworski et al. For this reason, there is an epistemic gain in giving them some leeway If representatives were bound by imperative mandates, the power of the majority would be strengthened at the expense of minorities Kelsen, However, the role of representatives is not to strictly represent the interests of their electors. They probably have a moral duty to make fair decisions, considering all affected interests.
Thus, here again there is a potential epistemic gain in granting them independence, but in a normative sense [increased fairness rather than accuracy of decision as in 2 ]. For these reasons, it is often thought that representatives must be legally independent from the will of their voters , but politically dependent on the influence of public opinion and not merely the opinion of the majority.
Their actions must generally comply with this will and deviations from it must be justified—by one of the reasons stated above for example. How should we assess these arguments in light of the contemporary challenges to electoral representation? The first point seems hard to deny: voters simply cannot fully know, at the time of selection, what kind of decisions their representatives will have to deal with.
They can anticipate some of them for sure, but not everything that might happen. Therefore, some degree of flexibility and thus independence is practically required. The second argument is less obvious. The non-elitist version points to a positional rather than intrinsic advantage: elected representatives may not be smarter or wiser than voters, but their daily involvement in politics gives them a privileged epistemic viewpoint.
They might for example have a better appreciation of political and economic constraints, overlooked by many citizens. They might be better informed, because they have strong incentives to follow the news and they are usually surrounded by all sorts of advisors It seems to me that these positional advantages are credible. The strength of the argument should however be qualified. Firstly, because it will often be the case that some experts or citizens are better informed or better placed to make a judgment on a particular issue than politicians.
Hence, the positional advantage is not absolute. They might just, on average , be better placed to judge some issues than ordinary citizens.
Secondly, the argument must be qualified because elected representatives will also suffer from important positional and epistemic disadvantages:. Thus, they do not have direct access to these disadvantaged standpoints. It is therefore important that representatives enjoy some degree of independence from public opinion. Nevertheless, keeping in mind the risks of biases, it seems equally important that they are kept in check by citizens.
The third argument faces a similar limitation: independence theoretically allows for an equal consideration of the affected interests, but it also leaves room for biases.
If we abandon elitist assumptions about the higher wisdom of the more educated, there is no guarantee that elected representatives will be more public-spirited or other-regarding than ordinary citizens. In a way, elected representatives are just ordinary citizens with a strong interest in politics and special traits favorable to election, such as charisma and communication skills.
Yet they remain affected by the same biases as other citizens, they have interests of their own and they are as corruptible as anyone placed in a position of power. Thus, we should not assume that the independence of representatives will necessarily increase fairness. What is nonetheless true is that strict majority rule is no guarantee of fairness either—a point to which I come back in section The Moral Constituency Objection.
Finally, the fourth argument is particularly strong. The need to be able to make compromises and thus to sacrifice some electoral promises is particularly important in contexts of coalition governments Manin, , pp. But it also matters more generally, in all contexts, because elections are not the only vector of popular will.
Thus, it is also desirable to have a government willing to make compromises with other kinds of representatives, be it in negotiations with unions or as a response to popular protest movements.
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